Watching the footage coming out of Iran these days, I am struck by the overall youthfulness of those marching through the streets of Tehran. Not surprising, perhaps – protests around the world are usually youthful affairs. But this led me to wonder whether demographics might play a larger role in the current troubles in Iran than in comparable protests elsewhere. Could demographics, along with more obvious and potent political factors, be at the root of these protests?
Anyone who has read Freakonomics by Steven Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner will find this sort of speculation to be quite familiar. Remember, it was in Freakonomics that Levit/Dubner proposed a connection between the collapse of the Cheausescu regime in Romania and the demographic shift (produced, in part, because of a national ban on abortions) towards a larger, younger population whose poor employment and social prospects left them more willing to agitate against dictatorship.
I think something similar may be at work in Iran as well. According to a 2008 study by the RAND Corportation, Iran enjoyed a surge in its fertility rate following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, due largely to official policies discouraging the use of contraception and government rationing of food and consumer items which by design favoured large families. The population of Iran grew at rates of up to 4% during this period. Yet by the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1989, the Iranian government “reversed course” and encouraged women to both space out their pregnancies and use contraception. Iran’s current fertility rate is now one of the lowest in the region.
Given that the demographic explosion occurred in the 1980s, it’s progeny would now be in their early-to-late 20s – the very group which appears to comprise the majority of those currently out in the streets of Tehran. It is this group which is entering a job market marked by 25% inflation and, according to the IMF World Economic Outlook for 2009, declining rates of real GDP growth. Add to this official estimates that put unemployment at 13% (with unofficial rates going much higher) and one is left with the feeling that there are simply too many young Iranians for the meagre number of jobs available in a shrinking economy. In short: Not good for the youth of Iran, and certainly not the sort of situation conducive to stable electoral politics. Vote-rigging and a system designed to guarantee clerical interference in the government don’t help, either.
I imagine another factor underlying the recent protests is the rapid rate of urbanization experienced by Iran over the last two decades. As the RAND report suggests, rapid urbanization, encouraged by investment and internal migration from rural areas to the cities, has placed greater strains on public infrastructures and led the government to attempt to retard further growth by limiting housing permits. Informal housing is growing as a result, and I would imagine has exacerbated the social/economic tensions between lower-income and middle-income citizens which have been produced, in part, by a highly competitive job market.
I should add that the demographic, economic, and social pressures indicated above does not necessarily translate into support for the challenger Mir-Hossein Mousavi. From what I can gather, President (?) Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s support lies among the rural and urban poor who have borne the brunt of the social pressures produced by such a large demographic shift. That being said, there seems to be a special kind of anger that college-educated youths (like those out in support of Mousavi) feel when facing a grim economic future that threatens to upset their hopes of upward social mobility (remember Tiananmen, 1989).
Again, though, corrupt political institutions don’t help.
- Photo courtesy of Al Jazeera English
hello! i like your blog!
in response to the post, I’d like to add that according to Ali (and news sources), over 50% of Iran’s population is under 30yrs old. That’s one mighty country of young people!